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SUPREME 
COURT WATCH 
By Reginald C. Oh 
0 n March 1, 2005, the U.S. Supreme Court issued an important and controversial decision regarding the constitutionality of the death penalty in Roper v. Sim-
mons, 125 S. Ct. 1183 (2005). The Court held that the death 
penalty cannot be applied to individuals under the age of 
eighteen at the time the crime was committed without vio-
lating the Eighth Amendment's prohibition against cruel 
and unusual punishment. 
The respondent, Christopher Simmons, committed a 
murder at the age of seventeen. He was tried and sentenced 
to death nine months after the murder, when he had turned 
eighteen years old. The Missouri Supreme Court initially de-
nied Simmons' postconviction appeal, and the federal courts 
subsequently denied his petition for writ of habeas corpus. 
However, after the United States Supreme Court in 2002 
rendered a decision holding that the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments prohibited the execution of mentally retarded 
persons, see Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), Simmons 
filed a new petition for postconviction relief He argued to 
the Missouri Supreme Court that the reasoning in Atkins 
also prohibits the execution of juveniles who were under the 
age of eighteen when they committed the crime. The Mis-
souri Supreme Court agreed and set aside Simmons death 
sentence. The state appealed the decision to the U.S. 
Supreme Court, and the Court granted certiorari. 
The Court, in a 5-4 decision authored by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy, upheld the Missouri Supreme Court and held that 
the Eighth Amendment prohibited the execution of juveniles 
under the age of eighteen. The critical issue for the Court was 
whether the earlier Atkins decision prohibiting the execution 
of the mentally retarded also applies to prohibit the execution 
of juveniles. The Court answered in the affirmative. 
In conducting its Eighth Amendment analysis, the Court 
reasoned that, in order to determine whether "punishments 
are so disproportionate as to be cruel and unusual," 125 S. Ct. 
at 1190, the Court must look to the ''evolving standards of 
Reginald C. Oh is an assistant profes-
sor ef law at the Appalachian School 
ef Law in Grundy, Virginia. 
State & Local Law News, Volume 28, Number 4, Summer 2005 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society ... . "Id. 
(quoting Trap v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-101 (1958)). The 
Court evoked the "evolving standards of decency" standard to 
defeat the standard originalist argument that the death 
penalty cannot be considered cruel and unusual since the 
death penalty was practiced when the Eighth Amendment 
was enacted. For the Court, the critical question is not to de-
termine what practices were considered cruel and unusual in 
1789, but to determine what practices are considered cruel 
and unusual in the present. For Justice Stevens, the Court's 
reaffirmation of the evolving standards of decency principle 
is "[p Jerhaps even more important than our specific holding 
today," and he asserted that it is now well settled that "our un-
derstanding of the Constitution does change from time to 
time .... " Id. at 1205. 
Of course, the task of ascertaining the moral standards of 
our time is a difficult one, a task that on first blush does not 
seem to provide objectively clear criteria for its determina-
tion. How exactly does the Court go about discerning current 
societal standards of decency? The Court answered the ques-
tion by stating that the Eighth Amendment, "like other ex-
pansive language in the Constitution, must be interpreted 
according to its text, by considering history, tradition, and 
precedent, and with due regard for its purpose and function 
in the constitutional design." Id. at 1190. 
In Roper, the Court examined three different sources in 
determining whether the evolving standards of decency pro-
hibited the execution of juveniles: the Court examined 
(1) national trends in the death penalty practices of the states, 
(2) its own independent judgment about the proportionality 
of the death penalty as a punishment for the crimes of juve-
niles, and (3) the laws of other countries and international 
sources regarding the death penalty. 
First, the Court concluded that the laws of the nation's 
legislatures show a clear national consensus morally disap-
proving of execution of juveniles. Based on precedent, the 
Court engaged in an objective analysis into the state of con-
temporary moral values regarding the death penalty. The 
Court examined the death penalty laws of state legislatures, 
which the Court considers as the "clearest and most reliable 
objective evidence of contemporary values" to ascertain if 
there is a national consensus on the morality of executing ju-
veniles. Id. at 1207. 
Specifically, the Court examined the number of states that 
prohibited the application of the death penalty to juveniles, 
the trends in the rates of abolition, and the number of juve-
nile executions in those states that permit execution of juve-
niles. The Court observed that thirty states prohibited the 
death penalty for juveniles. The thirty states included twelve 
states that have abolished the death penalty altogether and 
eighteen states that maintain the death penalty but prohibit 
its application to juveniles. Id. at 1192. For the Court, such 
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statistics provided clear evidence of a national consensus 
against the application of the death penalty to minors. 
Moreover, the Court also emphasized that in a span of 
fifteen years, five states had abandoned the death penalty for 
juveniles, and that in the past ten years, there have only been 
three executions of juveniles carried out in death penalty states. 
Second, the Court then went on to make its own inde-
pendent judgment on the cruel and unusual nature of execut-
ing juveniles. The Court essentially held that given the lack of 
maturity and underdeveloped sense of responsibility of juve-
niles, the death penalty effectively does not serve the goals of 
deterrence or retribution when applied to minors. Given "the 
susceptibility of minors to immature and irresponsible be-
havior," the Court reasoned that their actions are not as 
morally reprehensible as that of an adult. Id. at 1195. In ad-
dition, the Court concluded that it is not clear that the death 
penalty serves as a deterrent to juveniles who are not likely to 
engage in a rational, cost-benefit analysis about whether their 
actions may result in their execution. Id. at 1196. 
Finally, and perhaps most controversially, the Court then 
examined international sources in supporting its conclusion 
that execution of minors violates the Eighth Amendment. 
The Court noted that, presently, the United States is the only 
nation in the world that officially sanctions the execution of 
minors. It then emphasized that there is overwhelming inter-
national consensus that execution of minors is against con-
temporary international values and norms, to show how the 
practice of the United States is out of step with the rest of 
the international community. 
Whether one agrees with the Court's ultimate ruling, its 
rationale for holding that the execution of minors violates the 
Eighth Amendment is subject to criticism. First, the Court's 
evolving standards of decency criteria fails to account for the 
possibility that our standards of decency may devolve in the 
future. For example, a significant rise in the juvenile crime 
rate may create a strong demand for reinstitution of the death 
penalty for juveniles. If public opinion polls in several states 
strongly show support for execution of juveniles, must the 
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Court then reconsider its conclusion in Roper that national 
consensus exists on the impropriety of executing juveniles? 
Should the interpretation of the Eighth Amendment depend 
on the changing shifts and tides in the political climate of the 
several states? The Court seems to be under the presump-
tion that "evolving standards of decency" will always evolve 
towards supporting more limitations on the death penalty, 
when there always is the chance that the standards of decen-
cy may devolve towards greater support of death penalty 
measures, especially in the post 9/11 world. Reliance on an 
ever-shifting assessment of national morals is a tenuous basis 
upon which to render a constitutional decision. 
Second, the Court's reliance on international sources is 
highly questionable as a source of binding precedent. The 
Court similarly relied on international sources in striking 
down sodomy laws in Lawrence v. Texas, an opinion also au-
thored by Justice Kennedy. However, the question also re-
mains, should international law and morality influence 
American constitutional decision-making? The dissent, au-
thored by Justice Scalia, excoriated the majority for relying on 
international sources, accusing it of relying on illegitimate 
sources in interpreting the Constitution.Justice Scalia's argu-
ment has merit, although in actuality, the reliance on interna-
tional sources is probably there mostly for rhetorical effect 
rather than as legal precedent. The Court's opinion has 
greater persuasive force in the realm of public discourse when 
it points out that the United States was, up until the Roper 
decision, the only nation in the world that still officially sanc-
tioned the execution of juveniles. 
What, then, is the real constitutional basis for the Court's 
decision? Leaving aside the reliance on what state legislatures 
are doing about the death penalty and on international opin-
ion, what is left of the Court's opinion is its independent 
judgment that the execution of minors is disproportionate 
punishment given the emotional and mental capacity of 
minor offenders. In making its judgment, the Court relied on 
psychological evidence confirming the conclusion that mi-
nors have different emotional and mental capacities when 
compared to adults. Moreover, that analysis is supported by 
precedent, given the Court's recent ruling inAtkim prohibit-
ing the execution of the mentally retarded. 
The question left wide open after Roper is the constitu-
tionality of the death penalty itself. The Roper Court has 
basically provided an analytic framework that could eventu-
ally justify the conclusion that the death penalty as a whole 
violates the Eighth Amendment. That decision will likely not 
occur for some time, since a majority of states still practice the 
death penalty. However, international opinion is clearly 
against the death penalty, and the same analysis used to con-
clude that the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment 
for minor offenders actually could be used to conclude that 
the death penalty is a disproportionate punishment for adult 
offenders. Both Atkins and Roper have set up the possibility 
for the eventual abolition of the death penalty via a Court de-
cision. The question is, if and when five Justices will use those 
cases to conclude that the death penalty itself is offensive to 
the norms and standards underlying the Eighth Amendment. 
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